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Abstract
One of the greatest challenges posed to the student of Avicenna's psychology is whether he upholds a
hylomorphic or dualistic conception of the soul. The hylomorphic position is the one espoused by Aristotle,
in nuce that the soul is the entelecheia, or substantial form, of the body considered as matter. The dualistic
position is that the soul is a separate substance that controls the body, itself also a substance. The goal of this
essay is to determine the full complexity of Avicenna's position, by dissecting four of his great psychological
works, each from a different point in his career: The Compendium on the Soul, The Origin and the Return,
The De Anima from The Cure, and On the Rational Soul. Ultimately, we contend herein that the method we
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Avicenna's philosophy.
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I. Introduction
Avicenna  (ibn-Sīnā)  is  often  branded  a  Peripatetic,1 sometimes  with  the 
qualification that he managed to synthesize onto an Aristotelian substrate a variety of 
other traditions, ranging from the Galenic medical, to the Neoplatonic cosmological, and 
the Islamic theological.2 Generally, historians who make this observation follow upon it 
by  praising  Avicenna’s  systematic  synthesis  as  the  culmination  and  convergence  of 
distinct traditions of philosophical commentary. For these historians, Avicenna was the 
highest  iteration—but  an  iteration  no  less—in  a  long  chain  of  synthesizing 
commentators.3 The  chain  dates  back  to  the  third  century  AD  to  the  first  great 
commentator of Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and a little later to the founding of 
Neoplatonism by Ammonius Saccas and his disciples, Plotinus and Porphyry; with these 
men, we are told, arose the immediate concern of resolving first the tensions discretely 
inherent to Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophies, and then those difficulties in reconciling 
the one with the other. Avicenna’s place in the tradition occurs much later,  only after 
Themistius inherited the Neoplatonists’ synthesizing enterprise (fourth century AD); after 
another Ammonius, son of Hermeias, broke from the Neoplatonists and introduced a new 
hermeneutical method (sixth century AD); after the Christian Syriac translators brought 
such enterprise to the Arab-speaking world (eighth-ninth centuries AD); after ʾIsḥāq ibn-
Ḥunayn and the al-Kindī circle contributed their Arabic translations (ninth century AD); 
1 By many of his successors, most notably Al-Ghazālī, who criticized him for it in The Incoherence of the  
Philosophers (Tahāfut al-Falāsifaʾ), as well as by modern scholars, preeminently Gutas, Avicenna and 
the Aristotelian Tradition.
2 See Hall, “Interpreting Avicenna.”
3 Wisnovsky, “Avicenna and the Avicennan Tradition,” 97; Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian 
Tradition, 255-261; Hall, “Intellect, soul and body in Ibn Sīnā,” 63-64.
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and after al-Fārābi and the Baġdād Peripatetics picked all these elements up and worked 
them into their own syntheses (ninth-tenth centuries AD). We do not dispute that it is at 
this point, and under the influence of these many traditions, that Avicenna flourished; yet 
a  few  serious  problems  arise  for  attaining  a  more  comprehensive  understanding  of 
Avicenna’s philosophy when we simply categorize him as an iteration in a long chain. 
For  while  historians  seem  generally  united  in  proclaiming  the  height  of  Avicenna’s 
synthesizing genius,  they are  also quick to cast  the  many and frequent  strains in  his 
philosophy merely as necessary products of this same genius’ obstinate synthesizing. In 
other words, for these historians, although Avicenna was the best synthesizer to have ever 
lived, his philosophy still strains because of the inherent incompatibility of sections from 
Aristotle, Plato, Galen and Islam. This last opinion is the one that we contest: while it 
does much to account for some of the probable origins of the difficulties in Avicenna, it 
does little to help us understand how his most original arguments hang together; rather, it 
proceeds from the presupposition that they  do not. If this were the case, then it would 
mean that Avicenna was an excellent synthesizer—but a bad philosopher; and that, if so, 
in  a  world  today  where  interest  in  systematic  philosophical  syntheses  has  ebbed, 
Avicenna’s readership would probably be, at best, intellectually negligible.
What we propose here is to find alternative explanations to the frequent strains in 
Avicenna’s philosophy. We do not doubt that the bulk of the Avicennan corpus reads as if 
it  incorporates  elements  from  preceding  philosophical  traditions  into  a  remarkable 
systematic  synthesis.  What  we  do  doubt  is  whether  its  strains  are  a  result  of  this 
synthesis. Ultimately, our hope is that, if we were to reinterpret the causes of the corpus’ 
many strains, we would better understand the strains themselves. To this effect, we posit 
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two extreme possibilities, both of which relate to Avicenna’s independence as a thinker. 
The first is what most historians seem to presuppose, viz. that Avicenna’s works were 
merely  a  rehashing  of  Aristotelian  doctrines,  incorporating  tidbits  from  the  other 
traditions; and that Avicenna was only independent to the extent in which he chose to 
interconnect these traditions, and in the original ways in which he attempted to resolve 
their  inherent contradictions.  The other possible extreme is that Avicenna was a fully 
independent  thinker  in  his  own  right,  who  dressed  his  arguments  in  an  Aristotelian 
language and incorporated the other traditions out of convenience, for reasons external to 
the philosophy (e.g. a desire to gain wider readership and acceptance, or the necessity of 
securing  patronage);  in  other  words,  in  this  possible  scenario  his  works  would  only 
effectively  read like  a  synthesis,  though  it  would  only  incidentally be a  synthesis. 
Whether one of these possibilities is true, or close to the truth, is what we will examine 
below. The practical  purpose these two extremes serve is  to delimit  the scope of our 
inquiry;  they  frame  our  guiding  questions:  whether  Avicenna  worked  from the 
Aristotelian,  Neoplatonic,  Galenic  and  Islamic  traditions to  his  ultimately  original 
philosophical  arguments, or  from  an  already  unique  philosophy  to  a  seemingly 
incorporative product. Crucially, these questions are not meant to set up a false dilemma: 
the “or” in the preceding sentence should be read inclusively. It is quite possible—indeed,  
it will be suggested—that the fact is somewhere in between the extremes.
Part  of  the  difficulty  in  our  investigation  is  the  lack  of  work  done  on  the 
Avicennan  corpus  as  a  whole.  Dimitri  Gutas  remarked  already  in  1988  that  critical 
editions of a good portion of the corpus are hard to come by even in Arabic, which has 
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not  changed  much  to  date;4 translations  into  modern  European  languages  are  even 
scarcer. This is to the detriment of a large contingent of interested Western intellectual 
historians, who wish to study the development of Avicennism to better understand its 
contributions to European thought, but who are incapacitated by the language barrier.5 
Cognizant  of  this  great  impediment,  Gutas  published  in  1988  the  extremely  useful 
Avicenna  and  the  Aristotelian  Tradition,  in  which  one  may  find,  for  the  first  time, 
translations of many sections of those works of Avicenna that have been often overlooked 
by scholars, but which are still important to the intellectual historian. As can be inferred 
from our notes, this paper is greatly indebted to Gutas’ translations and commentaries and 
calls out for more of this kind of scholarship. Particularly troublesome to us is the fact 
that there has  been  little  work  done  on  the  authenticity  of  most  of  the  Avicennan 
corpus,6 which can cripple a truly genetic reading. Though in recent years some work has 
begun to be done in this area,7 there is still much to be desired. Lastly, Gutas also astutely 
observed that, although scholars are blessed with Avicenna’s autobiography, this fact has 
made it seem as if any further biographical research were unnecessary, resulting in our 
present ignorance about many details of the philosopher’s life and forcing us to take his 
autobiography often at face value.8
The  present  paper  will  attempt  to  make  these  problems  more  manageable  by 
concentrating on one aspect of Avicenna’s philosophy, namely psychology, and within it, 
on a particular point of tension. If our method guides us rightly, our hope is to propose at 
4 Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 1.
5 The present essay is a case-in-point; here we used whatever translations of Avicenna we could find into 
European languages; the result is that, notwithstanding our use of English, French, Portuguese, and 
Latin sources, we are limited in scope to less than a handful of Avicenna’s psychological works.
6 McGinnis, “Introduction,” ix.
7 See Reisman, “The Pseudo-Avicennan Corpus.”
8 Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 1.
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the end a solution to this point of tension that could be translated so as to elucidate many 
of the other strains spread throughout the philosophical corpus. In other words, we are 
using psychology, and a specific difficulty with Avicenna’s definition of the soul, as a sort 
of laboratory for determining a viable answer to the question of his independence; this 
insight,  we claim,  will  aid  in  understanding how the  whole  of  his  philosophy hangs 
together. The reason we use psychology as our “test case” in particular is that it plays a 
very central role in providing cohesion to Avicenna’s wider philosophy; Robert Hall, in 
fact, described it as the “spine of the system,” forming a central  hub that connects to 
cosmology,  physiology,  epistemology,  metaphysics,  thaumaturgy,  theology  and  even 
ethics and political theory.9 Gutas seconds this notion, saying that Avicenna’s theoretical 
psychology “presents in nuce” his entire philosophical system.10
Both Hall’s and Gutas’ opinions are buttressed by the fact that psychology works 
itself into every one of Avicenna’s major philosophical treatises.  Of these, Avicenna’s 
first oeuvre, A Compendium on the Soul (Maqāla fī n-nafs), was entirely psychological, 
as  was  his  very  last  work,  On  the  Rational  Soul  (Risāla  fī  n-nafs  an-nātiqa).  His 
cosmological treatise, The Origin and the Return (Al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād), the first text 
in which we find his mature metaphysical and emanationist scheme, is divided into three 
parts,  one  of  which  features  the  soul,  detailing  its  origination  and  permanence.  The 
encyclopedic The Cure (Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ), written at the request of his disciples, possesses 
his  longest  psychological  text.  The  shorter  summa,  The  Salvation (Kitāb  an-Najāt), 
mirrors the content and organization of The Cure.  There is even the question of his lost 
work, The Easterners (Kitāb al-Mašriqīyūn), written in Isfahān later in his career (after 
9 Hall, “Intellect, soul and body in Ibn Sīnā,” 63.
10 Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 72.
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1024), of which all that we possess is the prologue. This book has been the cause of much 
debate, especially since Avicenna promises to disclose in it “the fundamental elements of 
true philosophy”11—about which all we can do is speculate. What we do know is that 
psychology  is  invoked  already  in  The  Easterners’ prologue:  Avicenna  discusses  in 
relative length his possessing more intuition than other philosophers, applying to himself 
a principal tenet of his psychology.12 Lastly, it cannot go without mention that even in 
Avicenna’s  least  theoretical  and  most  practical  work,  the  comprehensive  Canon  of  
Medicine  (al-Qānūn  fī  t-tibb),  psychology  figures  in;  although  Avicenna  warned  his 
physician readers that theoretical psychology “lie[s] outside the province of the physician 
qua physician,” he still had to work into this treatise—and especially this one—at least 
some  account of the vital principle, even if in purely physical, often materialistic, and 
most certainly not metaphysical nor cosmological, terms.13
Ideally, we would look at each one of those works, map out all the areas in which 
the synthesis seems to strain too hard, where contradictions arise, and where, to solve 
these  problems,  Avicenna  had  to  intervene  with  a  new  and  original  idea;  and  then, 
analyzing the differences regarding these points among the various texts, we would study 
the historical circumstances surrounding the writing of these treatises, so as to ultimately 
understand  the  causes  of  Avicenna’s  incorporative  synthesizing,  and,  in  so  doing, 
understand also  the  extent  of  Avicenna’s  independence  as  a  thinker.  Such a  method, 
however, is impractical in the short term and, we would dare say, impossible for a single 
11 The Easterners, sec. Prologue §6.
12 Intuition, for Avicenna, is the ability to arrive at the middle term of a syllogism without having to work 
it out; it is the result of a connection of the human intellect to the heavenly Active Intellect, which is 
higher up on the emanationst scheme, closer to God.
13 Hall, “Intellect, soul and body in Ibn Sīnā,” 72-73.
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person. It  would be more realistic to replicate this method in a much narrower scale, 
focusing on one or two texts from each principal period of Avicenna’s life, and picking 
one  representative  area  of  tension,  mapping  out  its  changes  (if  any)  throughout  the 
different texts. Such is the method we employ herein. Should such labor bear good fruits, 
then perhaps this is a method we could suggest to our colleagues in the future. In the 
meantime,  we have  picked a  single  area  of  tension that  promises  to  be  telling;  it  is 
fundamental in the sense that it pervades the whole of Avicenna’s psychology, and it is 
essential in the sense that it addresses quite explicitly the definition of the soul.
II. Fleshing out the difficulties
As the chosen area of tension is about the very essence of the soul, every reader of 
Avicenna’s psychological works eventually has to come to grips with it. The problem is 
rooted  in  a  disagreement  with  Aristotle  regarding  the  generic  definition  of  the  soul: 
whereas Aristotle seems to define the soul in De anima II.1 as the substantial form of the 
body, Avicenna argues, in more than one place, that the soul is itself a substance, and, in 
the case of the rational soul, subsisting in itself separately from the body.14 What makes 
the departure from Aristotle problematical is that Avicenna still incorporates, verbatim, 
Aristotle’s generic definition of the soul into a variety of his treatises. In fact, Avicenna 
clearly states, in his principal psychological works, not only that the soul is the primary 
entelechy of the body, but particularly that it is also  a form, implying that the relation 
between soul and body is that of form to matter (i.e. hylomorphism).15 How can he, then, 
14 The Origin and the Return, III.10; The Cure: De anima, I.III; The Salvation, II.VI.XII-XIII; On the 
Rational Soul, §5.
15 A Compendium on the Soul, 2; The Cure: De anima, I.I.
7
André Gregori The Problem of Hylomorphism and Dualism 
in Avicenna: A Guide to Resolving Other Tensions
in the same treatises in which he provides that very definition, also argue that the soul is a 
substance, and in the case of the rational soul, not just a substance, but a separate and 
self-subsistent one? And, more importantly: what were his motivations? This section will 
deal with the first question, while the second is reserved to the next one.
The treatises we have chosen to investigate to answer these questions are: (I) from 
Avicenna’s early period, the Compendium on the Soul; (II) from his middle period, The 
Origin and the Return and (III) the psychological part (De anima) of The Cure; and (IV) 
from his late period his very last work  On the Rational Soul.  In terms of format, the 
contrast between these works is vast: the Compendium is a short dedicatory treatise; The 
Origin and the Return is an idiosyncratic collection of three treatises, each containing 
short, paragraph-long chapters; The Cure is long and encyclopedic, fleshing out in detail 
even the most minor considerations; and  On the Rational Soul is the shortest, reading 
much  like  a  hurried  and  cursory  summary.  Curiously,  however,  in  terms  of  their 
psychological content, these treatises differ only with regard to quantity, not substance; 
that is, they only differ with regard to how much of Avicenna’s doctrines fit into each, not 
the content of those doctrines. As we look to these samples from the Avicennan corpus to 
better understand the tension between the soul’s self-subsistent substantiality and its place 
in hylomorphism, one thing becomes apparent: what was an apparently “weak” tension in 
the Compendium becomes almost irresolvable in the later works, starting with The Origin 
and the Return. This difference is important, as it tells of the consistency of Avicenna’s 
philosophy, a fundamental piece to the puzzle of his ultimate independence as a thinker.
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1. Compendium on the Soul
In the Compendium Chapter 2 Avicenna explicitly states that “the soul is a form, 
and forms are realized perfections (entelecheia).”  Compendium  Chapter 9, however, is 
entirely a proof of the rational soul’s immateriality and substantiality.16 Avicenna’s proof 
seems to be a conflation of Aristotle’s argument in De anima III.5, viz. that the potential 
intellect  does not function through a bodily organ, with the one in III.6, viz. that the 
intellect can only think of indivisible things if those things are necessarily true (if they 
can  be  false,  Aristotle  posits,  then  they  are  divisible).  Aristotle  does  not  draw  the 
conclusion  in  either  of  these  passages  that  the  soul  is  a  substance;  inferring  such  a 
conclusion from these arguments is Avicenna’s own, original addition. Avicenna’s claim 
here,  however,  is  not  entirely  incompatible  with  Aristotle’s  position;  notice  that  in 
Compendium  Chapter 9  Avicenna  is  not  arguing  that  the  rational  soul  is  subsistent  
through itself. Furthermore, other arguments that we find in his later works—that the soul 
is perpetual, for instance—which arguments would lead us to infer his belief in a self-
subsistent soul, are entirely absent from the  Compendium. So long as there is room to 
believe that Avicenna was speaking of the soul as a substance, but immanent  to and 
dependent  upon  a  subject,  the  body,  for  its  existence,  then  there  is  some  room  for 
reconciliation with  Aristotle’s  position.  After  all,  in  De anima  II.1  Aristotle  uses  the 
phrase, “the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body,” which 
rings of Avicenna’s earlier usage of the word “form” in  Compendium  Chapter 2. That 
16 Van  Dyck  translated  it  “essentiality”  rather  than  “substantiality.”  Strictly  speaking,  essence  and 
substance  have  different  meanings  in  the  Peripatetic  tradition. The  original  word  that  Van  Dyck 
translated as “essence” is jawhar; this term figures in various other works by Avicenna, and it is usually 
translated as  “substance”  for  nuanced philosophical  reasons that  do not  merit  discussion here.  The 
Arabic word usually understood as “essence” is dat. For further reference, see the very useful Arabic-
Portuguese glossary in Iskandar, A origem e o retorno, 265-282.
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previous  phrase,  however,  is  not  to  imply  that  Aristotle  believes  that  the  soul  is  a 
substance per se subsistens, just as we cannot draw this inference from the Compendium. 
Rather, that phrase from De anima II.1 seems to imply that the soul, insofar as it gives 
being to the body, is  immanently a substance, or  that it  is a substance when taken  in  
conjunction with the body. It is in this light that we interpret Aristotle’s later assertion, 
still in II.1, that “we can dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul and the 
body are one: it is as though we were to ask whether the wax and its shape are one, or 
generally the matter of a thing  and that of which it is the matter” (that is, the form—
emphasis added). As such, although Avicenna leaves much unsaid in Compendium, part 
of the benefit of his doing so is that it gives us room to reconcile his statement that the 
soul is a form with his other claim that it is a substance. However, the fact that this is 
ambiguous, aside from making it a point of contention, does not resolve the tension.
2. The Origin and the Return
The tension manifests itself very differently in The Origin and the Return, where 
it is arguably transformed into a contradiction. In this treatise, we find a chapter (III.10) 
devoted to refuting “those who defend that the rational soul is an inseparable perfection.” 
Avicenna is, in fact, responding to arguments against the soul’s separate existence and 
self-subsistence, a position he espouses more overtly in Chapter III.6. The objections to 
which  he  responds  are  telling  in  themselves:  The  first  objection  paints  Avicenna’s 
position with much the similar colors that Plato uses in his description of how the soul 
governs the body. If  the soul were a separate  substance—the objection goes—then it 
10
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would govern the body much like a captain governs a ship;17 this would imply that, just as 
a captain enters and exits a ship, so would the soul be capable of entering and exiting the 
body.  Avicenna responds by rejecting the objection as a false analogy, and, in so doing, 
interestingly dissociating himself  from Plato.18 Avicenna is  more hesitant,  however  to 
dissociate himself from Aristotle. This is clear from his response to the second objection. 
This objection is entirely on hylomorphic, and therefore Aristotelian, grounds:
“If the soul existed separately from the body, no living thing, much less a human, 
would be united with it as form does to matter.”19
This is, in fact, a rephrasing of the tension that has, thus far, guided the entirety of 
this present paper, namely, that it is impossible to hold that the soul is separate and self-
subsistent, while also holding that it is a form in the sense in which Aristotle uses the 
word. However, Avicenna’s response still seems like an attempt to reconcile his position 
with  that  of  Aristotle.  First,  unlike the  dismissal  of  the  previous  objection,  Avicenna 
actually credits this objection with a response. Second, the framework he uses to resolve 
the objection is,  at  least  in  terminology,  Aristotelian.  Ultimately,  Avicenna’s response 
validates the objection, but at  the same time it  creates a new distinction, and all  this 
distinction does is explain the objection away. In a nutshell, Avicenna argues that, while it 
may be true that the soul is not united to the body as form is to matter, it is united in the 
sense that, insofar as it is a substance, it can only perfect itself (i.e. attain a certain level 
of completion) when attached to a particular matter, that has the capacity to receive it. 
17 Aristotle in De anima, II.1 uses precisely this same analogy, which he rules out; commentators like 
Thomas Aquinas (Sententia libri De anima, lib. 2. l. 2 n. 9) have generally interpreted Aristotle to be 
replying directly to Plato in this section, and rejecting his position.
18 Plato espoused a clearly dualistic psychology in the Timaeus and most notably in the Phaedo.
19 All the translations from the Portuguese are our own.
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Therefore, Avicenna attempts to detangle the difficulty by making the unity of soul to 
body  not  simply  incidental,  but  in  fact  causally  rooted  in  the  dispositions  of  each 
substance (i.e. of the body to receive the soul and of the soul to perfect itself on that 
body).  This,  however,  does  not  resolve  the  contradiction:  how  can  the  soul  be 
simultaneously a self-subsistent substance and a form attached to a body?
3. De anima from The Cure
Avicenna gives the subject more of a satisfactory treatment in the  De anima of 
The Cure, but he is still unable to resolve the difficulty. Right in Chapter I of the first 
book  of  De  anima,  Avicenna  says  the  soul  “is  a  form,”  and,  perhaps  to  be  more 
conciliatory to Aristotle, “as if a form.” Perhaps the latter is an issue of Avendauth’s Latin 
translation,  and it  would be  useful  if  the original  Arabic were consulted. Regardless, 
further down the page Avicenna gives an account of the soul that is less accommodating; 
in fact, it seems to contradict his response to the objections posed in The Origin and the  
Return III.10, since he says “the soul can be called ‘form’ when considered in relation to 
the matter in which it exists, and an animal or vegetative substance is constituted from 
both matter and form.”20 This suggests, then, that Avicenna is embracing a hylomorphic 
view of the soul, painting animals and plants as composite substances, that is, composed 
of  both  matter  and  form,  body  and soul.  Here,  then,  Avicenna  seems to  be  giving  a 
generic  definition of the soul that would encompass the rational soul. A little later on, 
however, in this same chapter, Avicenna adds that when he calls the soul a form, he is not 
talking about the rational soul; in fact, he specifically changes terminology, switching 
20 Emphasis added. Reading the antecedents of ex quibus utrisque to be forma and materia. All the 
translations from the Latin are ours.
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from “form” to “perfection,” so as to be more inclusive of the rational soul: 
“When we say, in teaching about the soul, that it is itself a perfection, we mean to 
give to ‘perfection’ more than just the meaning of the word ‘soul,’ and, even more 
than this, we mean to indicate that ‘perfection’ comprehends all the species of soul 
whatsoever, which is necessary [so as to include] the soul separate from matter 
[i.e. the rational soul].”
But the topic is not dropped altogether; Avicenna continues to employ the word 
“form” liberally, predicating it of soul, which he also calls substance. Further down this 
chapter, Avicenna, at last, addresses precisely this issue. He posits a hypothetical objector,  
who says to him, “When I say, ‘the soul is a substance,’ that is, ‘the soul is a form,’ I do 
not say this from a more general meaning of the word ‘form,’ but I take ‘substance’ to 
have  the  same meaning  as  ‘form.’”  And  yet,  just  as  Avicenna  explained  away  the 
objection in The Origin and the Return, he also shoos this one off: “There is nothing in 
that.”  The  hypothetical  objector,  however,  was  not  all  in  vain;  in  the  very  same 
paragraph, Avicenna sees himself obliged to finally clarify what he means by “form” in 
this  context:  “that  which does  not  exist  in a  subject  in  any way,”  which is  simply a 
restatement of one of Aristotle’s definitions of substance.21 In other words, it seems that 
here Avicenna is  using “form” strictly in  this  sense of “substance.” This seems to be 
confirmed by Chapter III, which is devoted entirely to proving that soul falls into the 
Aristotelian category of Substance. One line from this chapter summarizes Avicenna’s 
position well: “Therefore, the soul is a substance, because it is a form that does not exist 
in a subject.” This line would make it seem as if Avicenna were agreeing with the likes of 
Thomas Aquinas in considering the soul a substantial form; but, upon closer inspection, 
what Avicenna is really doing is different, since he is clearly predicating “substance” of 
21 Aristotle, Metaphysics, V.8.
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“form.” In other words, it seems that here Avicenna attempted to resolve his difficulty by 
employing “form” analogically, or,  even, equivocally,  that is,  deprived of the original 
Aristotelian sense of a principle immanent to  matter,  and concentrating solely on the 
sense it shares with substance. This is the pattern visible throughout the rest of The Cure’s 
De Anima.  Avicenna  keeping  the  word “form” in  this  context  is  suggestive;  we will 
consider his reasons for doing so in the next full section.
4. On the Rational Soul
Unlike  The  Cure,  Avicenna’s  last  work,  On  the  Rational  Soul,  is  the  least 
accommodating.  In  §5  we  see  quite  explicitly  that  “the  rational  soul  is  a  substance 
subsisting in itself, and is imprinted neither in a human body nor in any other corporeal 
entity.” What is more telling is that Avicenna adds, in the same section, that the soul “has 
a  certain  association  with  the  human  body  as  long  as  the  person  is  alive,  but  this 
association is not like the relation of a thing to its receptacle; it is, rather, like the relation  
of a wielder of an instrument to the instrument” (emphasis added). This is clearly the 
position of a dualist: instead of conceiving of the body’s actuality (entelecheia) as coming 
from  a  supervening  principle  (i.e.  form),  he  conceives  it  as  coming  from  another 
substance, as an instrument has actuality when it is being used by its wielder.22 When we 
juxtapose this with Avicenna’s remark in §10 regarding the status of the soul after death, 
we return to the tension between form and self-subsistent  substance. There,  Avicenna 
calls  the  soul a  form and he curiously brands  the body “a receptacle,”  a noteworthy 
departure from the more traditional and Aristotelian “matter.” This could be interpreted as 
22 Although Aquinas, in De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, sec. 6, is addressing the Averroists, his 
explanation of how a body can acquire actuality from something other than form is particularly useful.
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indication of how Avicenna is finally coming to terms with the fact that his theory of the 
soul has little resemblance left to hylomorphism; and that, by calling the soul “form” and 
the  body  “matter,”  he  would  just  be  confusing  things  further.  Alternatively,  this 
phenomenon might be an indication of the fact that Avicenna, at this point in his career, 
had little reason to appear Aristotelian. Whatever the reason, which we will be examining 
in the next section, Avicenna qualifies his choice of words as if precisely admitting that 
he has little hylomorphism left in his philosophy: he says in §10 that he does not mean 
“receptacle” in the sense of it being filled spatially by some occupant, but rather in the 
sense of it being filled by something else’s activity. This implies that he uses “form” in 
the sense of it being the principle of that activity, which is stricter than the Aristotelian 
sense. For Aristotle, form is not only a principle of activity, but it  is also primarily a 
principle of being to the matter it supervenes; for Avicenna, the only sense of “form” that 
was worthy of being imported into his philosophy was Aristotle’s secondary and ancillary 
one. That this sense of “form” may be clearer, if  we map it on to the analogy of the 
instrument and the wielder, the body is the instrument, and the form (the soul) is the 
wielder.23 The question this raises is why Avicenna would wish to replace “matter” with 
“receptacle” but maintain “form” for “soul.” Although the first would finally suggest a 
distancing from hylomorphism, the second seems to imply an attachment to it that he is 
still unable to shake off, even in this work, his last one.
23 Avicenna does not address what would be the logical extension of this: that if every principle of activity 
is a form, then a horse pulling a wagon is the form of wagon, just as a combustion which started a fire 
would be the form of fire, both of which propositions are absurd.
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III. Why include hylomorphism, and why not?
We see in the prologue of the Compendium that Avicenna wrote it as a dedication 
to  a  prince,  whom we find in  his  autobiography to  be the  Sāmānid sultān Nūḥ ibn-
Mansūr. Avicenna was around sixten years-old at the time of composition (ca. 996); he 
was  living  in  Buhārā,  the  capital  of  the  soon-to-crumble  Sāmānid  empire.  In  the 
autobiography we are  told  of  how,  when Avicenna  was  eighteen,  he,  having already 
mastered medicine as well as a variety of other disciplines, and, having started to make a 
name for himself among physicians because he frequently read and studied with them, 
was  summoned  to  help  cure  ibn-Mansūr,  who  had  to  succumbed  to  a  rare 
disease.24 Perhaps the fact that he came to the attention of the physicians in the first place 
was  because  he  had  submitted  the  Compendium  to  ibn-Mansūr  four  years  before. 
Regardless, this event not only brought Avicenna to the sultān’s attention, but awarded 
him the right to study the rare books in the prince’s library, many of which were Greek in 
provenance,25 transmitted to the Arab world through the Christian Syriac tradition and the 
Arabic  translations  of  ʾIsḥāq  ibn-Ḥunayn  and  al-Kindī’s  circle.  Since  Avicenna  only 
gained access to the library after he completed the Compendium, the rare books he saw 
there did not  in fact  have an impact  on his  writing.  He had,  however,  by that point, 
already  intensively  studied  “all  the  parts  of  philosophy.”26 The  Compendium  was 
precisely a  product  of  such intense study,  and is  widely considered to  be Avicenna’s 
maiden work.27
24 The Life of Ibn Sina, 35.
25 Ibid., 37.
26 Ibid., 27.
27 Van Dyck, A Compendium on the Soul, sec. Preface
16
André Gregori The Problem of Hylomorphism and Dualism 
in Avicenna: A Guide to Resolving Other Tensions
We are told in the autobiography that Avicenna was assigned an administrative 
post with the sultān just around the time of his father’s death;28 although Avicenna does 
not  supply  the  year,  the  translator,  William Gohlman,  citing  Avicenna’s  disciple  ibn-
Funduq,29 believes  it  was  around  1002,  some four  years  after  the  Compendium was 
written; the dating suggests that the work could have assisted in capturing the attention of 
the court physicians but also of the Sāmānids themselves. It makes sense that it would, 
since this seems to have been Avicenna’s intention in the first place: he had wished to 
present ibn-Mansūr with a gift that would be, in his own words, “of all presents, the one 
he [would] appreciate most.”30 In a very practical level, therefore, this treatise was the 
medium in which Avicenna had chosen to show off his talents to the prince; as such, 
Avicenna would, in all probability, want to work in those aspects of his philosophy that 
would make him look the most appealing, while also excluding the ones that would raise 
any question concerning his intellectual or even religious integrity.
In  this  light,  we  can  begin  to  understand  why  the  treatise  is  the  most 
accommodating to the tension between the soul’s purported hylomorphism and its self-
subsistent  substantiality:  Avicenna  was  trying  to  keep  the  polemics  to  a  minimum. 
Moreover,  we later  learn in  On the  Rational  Soul,  in  which  Avicenna makes a  brief 
mention of the Compendium, that he crafted the treatise as a “research” paper,31 meant to 
be reflective of—not in conflict with—what was then the state of philosophy inherited 
from  the  Greeks  (falsafa).  The  Compendium was  not,  in  other  words,  meant  to  be 
original. In fact, if we compare the Compendium to the much more thorough De anima 
28 The Life of Ibn Sina, 41.
29 Ibid., 124.
30 A Compendium on the Soul, sec. Prologue.
31 On the Rational Soul, §11.
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from The Cure, we find that the sections not included in the former were precisely those 
that, insofar as they were original, were therefore neither uncontroversial nor reflective of 
the current state of falsafa. These missing sections are: the doctrine of the perfected “holy 
soul” (which explains prophecy), the argument for the temporal origination of the soul, 
the denial of the soul’s ability to transmigrate, and, more importantly, the argument for 
the immortality of the soul. When juxtaposed to this list, Avicenna’s decision to include 
the argument for the soul’s substantiality in Chapter 9 seems like a serious anomaly; yet 
his unwillingness to go much farther, that is, his hesitance to brand the soul, at this point, 
as  self-subsistent,  perhaps  indicates that  Chapter  9  was  included only as  a  matter  of 
interpretative clarification. As we have seen in Section II.1, the arguments in Chapter 9 
were also not wholly irreconcilable with Aristotle’s position.
In fact,  far  from an anomaly,  the arguments in Chapter 9 of the  Compendium 
actually foreshadow the overt espousal of dualism that we first see in Chapter III.6 of The 
Origin and the Return. In this treatise, Avicenna incorporates most of the elements from 
the Compendium into a much wider Neoplatonic emanationist scheme. Aristotle’s active 
intellect, for instance, originally just the nous poietikos abiding in each individual person, 
is transformed to correspond to the lowest of the Neoplatonists’ celestial intellects.32 The 
reason why Avicenna would make these accretions is still the matter under inspection. We 
can start to form an answer to this question by considering the very first sentence of The 
Origin and the Return:
“In this treatise I wish to show the truth of what one finds among the Peripatetics 
and what they arrived at concerning the origin and the return so as to gain favor 
32 The Origin and the Return, chap. III.5.
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with the shaykh Abū-Aḥmad ibn-Muḥammad ibn-Ibrāhīm al-Fārisī.”33
Avicenna admits here that he wrote the treatise for a very practical purpose, which remits 
to the Compendium: just as that treatise was written back in 998 to please a sultān, ibn-
Mansūr,  so was  The Origin and the Return  written in  around 1012-1014 to  please a 
shaykh, al-Fārisī. The method employed in each work was also essentially the same: to 
show off a talent in exposing and commenting on Peripatetic philosophy. The difference 
is  that,  while  the  Compendium  was  intended  to  be  a  summary  of  the  Peripatetics’ 
psychology,  Avicenna purported to make  The Origin and the Return  an exposition of 
what he thought was their  cosmology.  This difference makes it  clearer why Avicenna 
would have included elements from Neoplatonism to begin with: in so doing,  he was 
simply reflecting what was then already customary among expositors of falsafa. Such a 
pervasive culture of integrating Neoplatonism into Aristotelianism was partially due to 
authorship misattributions traceable to the translation processes. Ever since al-Kindī, for 
instance,  translated  and  reorganized  Plotinus’  Enneads,  giving  it  the  new  title  The 
Theology of Aristotle, much of the Arab world bought into the false notion that Aristotle 
himself  had  held  Plotinus’ views.  Still,  although  this  fact  helps  us  understand  why 
Avicenna  would  include  Neoplatonism  in  a  work  purporting  to  be  an  exposition  of 
“Peripatetic” cosmology, the question remains as to why Avicenna would make original 
accretions to an already-established philosophical and interpretative tradition. Previous 
synthesizers  like  al-Fārābi  had  successfully  incorporated  Neoplatonism  into 
Aristotelianism without  having to  recur, for instance,  to arguments of the soul’s  self-
33 Ibid., sec. Prologue.
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subsistent substantiality.34
The history surrounding the composition of The Origin and the Return suggests a 
few alternative answers. First, there is the fact that—like the Compendium—this treatise 
was a dedication, this time to a shaykh, al-Fārisī. Unlike the sultān ibn-Mansūr, however, 
who figures in a variety of historical accounts, we actually know very little about al-
Fārisī.35 All  the  records  we have  about  the  man are  the  ones  that  Avicenna’s  closest 
disciple,  Abū-ʿUbayd al-Juzjānī,  provides in his biography of Avicenna:  first,  that  al-
Fārisī was an “amateur of [these] philosophical sciences,” i.e. the ones included in  The 
Origin and the Return; second, that Avicenna was ultimately successful in securing al-
Fārisī’s patronage, since the man gave him a house.36 Our present ignorance concerning 
al-Fārisī’s life is admittedly an obstacle to understanding why Avicenna would seek the 
favor of that man in particular. We can still, however, extrapolate an answer based on a 
few suggestive facts: For one, we are left with the title “shaykh,” which was was used 
back then (as it is now) as a form of respect meaning roughly “wise elder.” Avicenna’s 
calling al-Fārisī a “shaykh” perhaps hints at the fact that the man had a certain amount of 
influence within the local intellectual, if not political, communities. It seems that access 
to the latter was specifically what Avicenna sought; after all, he did write the treatise just 
after a calamitous period in his life, in which he was expelled from Buhārā and forced to 
move from city to city.  In fact,  Avicenna’s stay in  Jurjān,  al-Fārisī’s city,  was a  rare 
moment of quietude for him: by 1005, some 7 years before The Origin and the Return 
was  written,  the  Qarāhānid  Turks  had  overrun  the  Sāmānids  in  Buhārā.  With  this, 
34 See al-Fārābi, L'épître Sur L'intellect (Al-Risāla Fīʾl-ʿAql)
35 The Life of Ibn Sina, 126 n54; Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 98 n1.
36 Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 98
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Avicenna had effectively lost the protection gained during the sultanate of ibn-Mansūr. 
Since Avicenna had previously held a high post in the sultān’s administration, he likely 
found little or no favor with the occupying Turks. As a matter of fact, we know from the 
autobiography that the reason he moved to Jurjān in the first place was to be under the 
protection of Amīr Qābūs,  then the ruler of the province.  Before Avicenna got there, 
however, the amīr was seized and thrown in jail.37 The safety of Jurjān, therefore, was at 
best uncertain. In fact, we know that shortly after moving to Jurjān Avicenna relocated to 
Dihistān, where he stayed for an equally short period, possibly because he was taken 
seriously ill; from there he moved back to Jurjān, where, if al-Fārisī’s patronage meant 
anything, Avicenna was probably more well-connected. It does not seem unreasonable, 
then, that The Origin and the Return should have been written to attract the attention of 
potential intellectual sponsors and political protectors. Shaykh al-Fārisī might have been 
the gateway to these men, or he might have been one himself  (he did, after all,  give 
Avicenna a place to live). We also know that by the time Avicenna had met his disciple 
al-Juzjānī (ca. 1012), he was employed by Sultān Ziyārid Qābūs of Jurjān, implying he 
did  eventually  capture  the  attention  of  the  local  political  elite,  either  through  the 
intermediation of al-Fārisī or through some other means.38 Either way, this would suggest 
that Avicenna’s purpose in The Origin and the Return, which was a dedicatory work like 
the  Compendium,  was  to  please;  and  that,  just  as  Avicenna  was  wary  of  new  and 
potentially polemical ideas in the earlier Compendium, so would he want to be cautious 
in this later treatise.
This was not, however, what Avicenna did.  Rather, he starkly departed in  The 
37 The Life of Ibn Sina, 43
38 The Cure, al-Juzjānī's Introduction §2; Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 60 n3
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Origin and the Return from the careful “research” method employed in the Compendium. 
In fact, whereas in the latter Avicenna avoided polemics, in the former he included many 
of the polemical parts that we later see in The Cure39—among which we class Avicenna’s 
overt espousal of dualism. This is admittedly surprising; our surprise is only tempered by 
the fact that he was not all reckless: in The Origin and the Return, as afterwards in The 
Cure, Avicenna diligently refuted objections in an attempt to show how his conclusions 
were both sounder and had more explanatory power than those of his objectors.40 This 
new method is  perhaps  a  sign that  Avicenna,  by this  point  thirty-two years  old,  was 
growing more intellectually mature and secure. At a point in his life in which there was 
so much to threaten his well-being, it would seem logical that he would want to find 
physical  security  by  employing  the  talent  about  which  he  felt  most  secure.  It  would 
therefore  seem  unreasonable  that  he  would  go  out  on  a  limb  making  potentially 
dangerous novel claims—unless he were confident that these innovations were buttressed 
by a strong foundation.
A hypothesis as to the purpose such innovations served is that they would set 
Avicenna apart from other potential competitors, and, if persuasive, would do much to 
enrich the  learning  of  such an “amateur  of  [the  philosophical]  sciences” as  al-Fārisī. 
Furthermore,  Avicenna’s  sense  of  intellectual  security  must  not  have  developed  in  a 
vacuum. In fact,  we know that by this point Avicenna had already garnered a certain 
reputation for being a great intellectual; so much is implied by the verses that al-Juzjānī 
recited to him on the occasion of his return to Jurjān:
39 Listed at the top of page 18.
40 An example of which we analyzed in section II.2.
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“When I became great, no country could hold me;
When my price went up, I lacked a buyer” (emphasis added).41  
Avicenna therefore had a name to live up to; merely regurgitating Neoplatonic cosmology 
and Aristotelian psychology would not suffice to put him on a plain any higher than that 
of  the  many  other  expositors  of  his  time,  which  is  why  he  included  the  original 
accretions. We have direct evidence, in fact, that Avicenna included these novel claims 
into his  work precisely to distinguish it  from that of competing expositors.  One such 
piece of evidence is a letter that Avicenna wrote to a disciple, a certain Kiyā. In the letter 
Avicenna makes particular mention of a group of intellectual rivals based in Baġdād,42 
whom he accuses of “disagreement, obtuseness, and wavering […] on the subject of the 
soul  and  the  intellects,”  branding  them  “simple-minded.”43 His  particular  point  of 
contention with them is that they lacked an understanding of the fundamental principles 
underlying Aristotle’s psychology. These principles, we are told, are to be inferred from 
the Physics; importantly, however, they are not manifest in themselves. Rather, Aristotle 
supposedly  “concealed”  them;  Avicenna’s  principal  problem  with  the  Baġdādīs  is 
precisely that they had thus far been unable to reveal these hidden principles. The effect 
of this is that they “approached the house from the rear instead of the [front] door,” that 
is,  they  built  their  entire  interpretation  of  Aristotle  on  a  stack  of  cards,  on  flimsy 
41 The Life of Ibn Sina, 43.
42 Although the letter was written in 1036, one year before Avicenna’s death (that is, many years after the 
writing of The Origin and the Return in around 1012), it alludes to a group of Baġdādī expositors who, 
according to Gutas, were Nestorian Christians, and among whom was a certain famous writer Abū-l-
Farraj Ibn-at-Tayyib. We learn from Richard Walzer that this man was a disciple of the Arabic translator  
and expositor Al-Ḥasan ibn-Suwār (fl. 942-after 1017). The Baġdād Nestorians were therefore active 
during the entirety of Avicenna’s lifetime.
See particularly Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 60 n1; Walzer, “New Light on the 
Arabic Translations of Aristotle,” 102
43 Avicenna, “Letter to Kiyā,” quoted in Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 60
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superficialities rather than deep first principles.44 Elucidating these hidden first principles 
is just the task that Avicenna sets for himself in  The Origin and the Return,  and it is 
precisely through this that he would seek to distinguish himself. The last paragraph of the 
treatise’s preface seems to suggest as much:
“In these [three] parts I intend to clarify what [the Peripatetics] have left obscure,  
to  reveal  what  they  have  hidden  and  concealed,  to  gather  what  they  have 
dispersed, to unfold what they have summarized into few words, to the best of the 
limited capacity of a person beset by many difficulties: the age of scholarship is 
becoming  extinct,  concern  with  the  objects  of  philosophy  is  diminishing  and 
turned towards other pursuits, and hatred is turned against those who labor for 
unveiling a part of Truth. Moreover, eagerness and energy are exhausted from the 
minds of those who have suffered and been the subjects of so many trials of this 
age as I have been. But God is our recourse, for with Him are power and might!” 
(emphasis added).45
That the self-subsistent substantiality of the soul is one of these things that the 
Peripatetics  “have  left  obscure”  is  once  again  evinced  by  the  letter  to  Kiyā.  One of 
Avicenna’s qualms with the Baġdādīs is that they left out a fundamental principle from 
their exposition of Aristotle’s  De anima, namely, that “the thing in which the universal 
intelligibles are conceived is indivisible.”46 This is essentially that same argument we saw 
in Chapter  9  of  the  Compendium;  it  is  from this argument that  Avicenna,  back then, 
already deduced the soul’s substantiality. But in the letter to Kiyā he makes it clear that 
his interpretation did not stop there. Rather, he derives from the argument of indivisibility 
what he could not make explicit in the  Compendium: that the soul is  per se subsistens. 
Ultimately,  then,  this  is  a  conclusion  that  Avicenna  infers  from  “what  they  [the 
Peripatetics] have hidden and concealed.” That Avicenna, therefore, should have included 
44 Ibid.
45 The Origin and the Return, sec. Preface.
46 Avicenna, “Letter to Kiyā,” quoted in Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 61
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this novel claim in a work as early in his career as the The Origin and the Return, would 
set him leagues apart from the Baġdādī expositors, and thereby might have given him an 
aura of a singular and unmatched understanding of Aristotle that would merit him the 
much needed patronage of any true “amateur of the philosophical sciences.” It would not 
be surprising,  therefore,  that it  was only a little after  The Origin and the Return was 
finished and copies were made that Avicenna started garnering sufficient attention from 
intellectuals from lands near and far as to award him the companionship of a cohort of 
promising disciples, the most notorious of which was Abū-ʿUbayd al-Juzjānī.
It  was  supposedly  for  these  disciples  that  Avicenna  wrote  his  philosophical 
magnum opus, The Cure. His motivation to do so was apparently their frequent entreaties 
to collect his works into a single treatise. Al-Juzjānī composed an introduction to  The 
Cure in which he details this fact: apparently he and other disciples47 were gathered with 
Avicenna in Jurjān and were lamenting the fact that their master had scarcely kept copies 
of his past work for them to consult, upon which pretext they requested that he would 
write them a new, comprehensive work including all areas of his philosophy.48 Avicenna 
was at first hesitant but agreed upon the condition that they would not demand from him 
that he should stick to the ipsissima verba of the texts of falsafa.49 This was an important 
precondition, as Avicenna’s brief period of quietude in Jurjān soon came to an end with 
even more political turmoil,  precluding access to the Aristotelian corpus. Some of the 
events that followed are very colorful, and it is all the more impressive that Avicenna 
should  have  continued  writing  such  a  massive  and  encyclopedic  work  as  The  Cure 
47 Ibid., 41 n8
48 The Cure, sec. al-Juzjānī's Introduction §3
49 Ibid.; Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 41 n9
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throughout all these events. For a while Avicenna had relative security to do this, since he 
even took up another administrative post (besides the one he had with Sultān Ziyārid 
Qābūs) with the sultān of nearby Rayy, Majd ad-Dawla.50 This proved, however, a bad 
mistake, as this new sultān was soon toppled by the invading forces of Amīr Šams-ad-
Dawla,  forcing Avicenna to move again.51 It  is from this period onwards that he had 
infrequent access to primary sources. By this point he had been able to start work on the 
physical and logical parts of The Cure with access to Aristotle,52 but as we will see below 
this soon came to an end.
Since Avicenna was forced to move, he went this time to Hamadān, the capital of 
the  invading kingdom. What  is  quite  impressive is  how, by this  point,  Avicenna had 
become very good in capturing the attention of potential patrons. Even in a completely 
new environment,  not  to  say a  heretofore hostile  country,  Avicenna also managed to 
quickly climb the ranks, working his way into this amir’s administration, and up higher 
than he had ever done before.53 This came at a cost to his writing, however, as his new 
“occupation was distressful” and “a waste of our [Avicenna’s and al-Juzjānī’s] time.”54 
This new occupation was the vizierate, which he was awarded after he treated the amīr of 
a colic,  but which was “distressful” because it nearly cost him his life: Avicenna was not 
much of a military commander, though he was obliged to be one in his new capacity, 
which resulted in his troops mutinying against him, demanding his execution.55 Though 
50 The Life of Ibn Sina, 49
51 Ibid., 51.
52 The Cure: De anima, sec. al-Juzjānī's Introduction §2.
53 Apparently Avicenna was aided by a certain benefactress named Kadabānūyah, but what principally 
catapulted him to preeminence was the very practical utility that he offered the amīr: experienced as he 
was in medicine, he treated the sovereign of a deadly disease, much like he had done in the episode of 
ibn-Mansūr. See The Life of Ibn Sina, 53
54 The Cure: De anima, sec. al-Juzjānī's Introduction §3
55 The Life of Ibn Sina, 53.
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the  amīr  refused,  Avicenna  was  sent  to  jail,  but  eventually  called  back  as  the  king 
relapsed again into disease. Treating the amīr a second time awarded Avicenna not only 
his freedom but the vizierate again.56 During this period he went back to work on  The 
Cure, composing the mathematical parts and writing more of the physics, still with access 
to  Aristotle  (he  had  not  yet  begun,  however,  the  psychological  parts).57 During  this 
interval of relative security was also when he finished the first book of  The Canon of  
Medicine; yet, as was the pattern with Avicenna’s life, this period too soon came to an 
end as the amīr died of the colic while on campaign. This time, however, Avicenna’s 
security  was  not  immediately  threatened,  since  the  amīr’s  successor  and  the  courts 
wanted him to stay on as vizier. Avicenna’s plans, though, were elsewhere: he decided to 
go into voluntary exile, partially because he wanted to support another, contending king, 
and partially because he wanted to rid himself of his “distressful” bureaucratic duties.58 It 
was  in  this  period  that  he  finished the  Physics  of  The Cure,  writing particularly  the 
psychological parts; he also quite prolifically composed the entire metaphysical part. Al-
Juzjānī  recounts he did this  in  less  than twenty days,  but,  more importantly,  without 
access to any sources.59
If al-Juzjānī’s account is true, it means that Avicenna wrote the entire De anima of 
The Cure based only on his own original ideas and on what he had committed to memory 
from Aristotle and the commentary traditions. This has the momentous implication that 
Avicenna’s purpose by this point, at least in the De anima and in the Metaphysics of The 
Cure,  was not simply to  expose Aristotle,  nor to  extract the “concealed” fundamental 
56 Ibid.
57 The Cure, sec. Prologue §5
58 Avicenna, The Life of Ibn Sina, 57
59 The Cure, sec. al-Juzjānī's Introduction §4
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principles from Aristotle’s terse and often cryptic accounts of corollary principles, but 
rather  to  describe  the  fundamental  principles  in  themselves,  regardless  of  all  the 
hermeneutical and historical baggage. This helps explain why the psychological parts of 
The Cure are such a drastic departure from hylomorphism, much less accommodating 
than the Compendium and The Origin and the Return: Avicenna’s project, here, was not 
to be an Aristotelian fundamentalist but a fundamentals fundamentalist.  Thus the first 
sentence from the prologue to the entire The Cure:
“Our purpose in this book, which we hope that time will allow us to complete, and 
that success granted by God will attend us in its composition, is to set down in it  
the  gist  of  the  Fundamental  Principles  which  we  have  Ascertained—both  the 
Fundamental Principles contained in the philosophical sciences attributed to the 
ancients  and  based  on  methodical  and  Verified  theoretical  analysis,  and  the 
Fundamental  Principles  Discovered  by  [a  series  of]  insights  cooperatively  
attaining the truth which was diligently pursued for a long time—until it finally 
results in a straightforward compendium upon which most opinions will agree and 
which will help remove the veils of fanciful notions” (emphasis added).60
Notice that Avicenna describes here two methods of attaining the fundamental principles: 
the first, through explication of what the ancients wrote; the second, through a separate 
process, which entails “discovery” by  “insights.” Since Avicenna did not have Aristotle 
in front of him when writing The Cure’s  De anima, the method employed therein must 
have been the second. Curiously, however, even if Avicenna was not using Aristotle, he 
still retained the latter’s vocabulary (though not his semantics). We can only speculate as 
to why he would do so, but it  seems logical that  he would want to keep a language 
understood by his audience, who were in this case his disciples, and who were used to the 
very peculiar  jargon of  falsafa.  Moreover,  even if  The Cure’s  De anima was written 
without an explication of Aristotle’s texts, there were sections in  The Cure, particularly 
60 Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 50.
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the Logic and sthe earlier parts of the Physics, that still closely reflected the commentary 
traditions. As such, Avicenna would need a common language for all The Cure, which is 
why  terms  like  “form,”  “matter,”  “substance,”  and  “perfection”  are  to  be  found 
throughout  all  the  multiple  parts  of  this  truly encyclopedic  work.  At  the  same  time, 
keeping a single common language for the whole of The Cure would have required a deal 
semantic gymnastics, especially when Avicenna’s independently discovered fundamental 
principles conflicted with those already established in the commentary tradition. It is of 
no wonder, therefore, that by the time Avicenna got around to writing the De anima, that 
is, the sixth and last book of  The Cure’s Physics, his usage of “form” and “substance” 
only fit Aristotle’s language materially, but in fact had substantially departed from it in 
meaning. This should help explain his analogical use of the words that we described in 
Section II.3 above.
Avicenna in his last treatise On the Rational Soul had none of the aforementioned 
reasons for keeping a strict adherence to Aristotle’s language: unlike The Cure, this was a 
short and cursory summary of his psychology, and psychology alone; it was not explicitly 
written for  his  disciples;  nor  was  it  a  dedicatory piece like the  Compendium or  The 
Origin and the Return. In fact, we have nothing that directly points to why he wrote it. 
The treatise’s last paragraph, however, provides a few telling clues:
“This then is what we wished to mention on this occasion in explanation of this 
divine word [i.e. the rational soul]. As for the demonstrative proof establishing 
that the rational soul is a substance, subsists by itself, is free of any corporeality, is 
not imprinted on any corporeal entity, survives after the death of the human body, 
and whether its condition after death is one of blessing or punishment, it involves 
a long and elaborate investigation and can be brought to light only after numerous 
premisses have been mentioned. As a matter of fact, I happened to write at the 
beginning  of  my  career  forty  years  ago  a  summary  treatise  setting  forth  the 
knowledge about the soul and related matters by following the method of those 
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who engage in philosophy through research; whoever wishes to find out about the 
soul  should  study  this  treatise  because  it  is  appropriate  for  students  who  do 
research.  But God Almighty, ‘guides whomsoever He will’ to the way of  those 
who engage in philosophy through direct experience—may He put us and you in 
the latter group!” (emphasis added).61
Avicenna is saying here  that On the Rational Soul is not a collection of proofs; in fact, he 
points to the Compendium those students who might like to read such proofs. These are 
the students “who do research,” i.e. those who read other people’s proofs or expositions 
of the truth. It is the last sentence, however, that suggests to whom Avicenna really was 
writing, and the concluding prayer is a clear indication of how he was biased towards this  
group;  yet  who were they? He tells  us they are students “who engage in philosophy 
through direct  experience.”  Now, since he pits these people against  the ones who do 
research,  we know it  excludes  those students who attain philosophical  truths through 
proofs. Does that mean, then, that the students in question are the ones who work things 
out for themselves? Or does the meaning of the phrase hinge on the word “experience,” 
implying  some sort  of  mysticism? Scholars like Seyyed Nasr  have  defended the  last 
position.62 We  will  contend  in  the  next  section  that,  though  there  are  elements  in 
Avicenna’s philosophy that might seem mystical, the explanation for them is in fact more 
mundane. Meanwhile,  we are left with the task of explaining why Avicenna was less 
accommodating to hylomorphism in On the Rational Soul than in any of the other works 
we have considered herein. In a very specific sense, the reason we propose remits to the 
one  we  suggested  in  our  discussion  of  The  Cure:  Avicenna  here  seems  to  want  to 
maintain a position of “fundamentals fundamentalism;” in other words, he here seems 
61 Avicenna, On the Rational Soul, §11
62 Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines.
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more concerned with expounding fundamental principals than with strictly adhering to 
the constrictive language of the Aristotelian commentary tradition. The difference is that 
the hurdles that kept him attached to a superficially hylomorphic language in The Cure’s 
De anima were no longer present for him when he was writing On the Rational Soul—
which would explain why he stopped calling the body “matter” and instead settled on the 
much less hylomorphic “receptacle.” Since the treatise intentionally reads much more 
like  a  dogmatic  list  of  facts  than  a  presentation  of  proofs,  Avicenna  was  under  no 
obligation to try to work in, or even address, conflicting positions. Indeed, it would seem 
odd in the context of this treatise—which is so short and cursory—if he did.
IV. Avicenna’s independence of thought
To this point, we have argued for four key claims relating to the tension between 
Avicenna’s  apparently  hylomorphic  definition  of  the  soul  on  the  one  hand,  and  his 
dualistic conception of it on the other: (i) that although the inspected psychological works 
differ in terms of language and terminology, in terms of the material they expose they 
only differ with regard to quantity, not substance; (ii) that Avicenna was not able, in any 
of the treatises we have inspected, to satisfactorily reconcile his dualistic view of the soul 
with the traditional hylomorphic one, nor vindicate this latter one over the former; (iii) 
that this tension grew progressively more severe over time, Avicenna coming to embrace 
dualism more overtly; (iv) that the presence of hylomorphism in each of the inspected 
works, as well as the degree of such presence, can be strongly explained in each case by 
circumstantial,  non-philosophical,  historical  reasons.  The  question  now  turns  to 
Avicenna’s independence as a thinker, which we framed by two possible extremes in our 
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Introduction:  the  first,  that  Avicenna  was  merely  an  iteration  in  a  long  chain,  an 
intellectual heir to a variety of preceding philosophical traditions, the doctrines of which 
formed the substance of his incidentally original philosophy; the second, that he was an 
independent thinker in his own right, discovering the principles of his philosophy mostly 
by himself, which principles he would then dress in the language of preceding traditions 
for  reasons  external  to  the  system.  Here,  we will  contend  that  the  truth,  though not 
negating the first extreme, approaches more the second one. We infer this claim from the 
conclusions  we  have  enumerated  above  and  from  additional  primary  material:  our 
conclusions all point towards the second extreme, which tendency we will try to support 
and confirm by Avicenna’s own account of his role and method as a philosopher.
Our conclusions complement one another; if we take them together, we can infer a  
further  set  of  conclusions.  First,  if  Avicenna  was  truly  unsuccessful  in  incorporating 
hylomorphism into his psychology (ii), and if his psychological works really only differ 
with regard to the quantity, not substance, of their arguments (i), then it should follow 
either that Avicenna was a poor philosopher from the start, never really understanding the 
strain in his philosophy with regard to hylomorphism; or, that he never really espoused 
the  doctrine  to  begin  with.  We have  found  reasons  that  strongly  justify  the  second, 
reasons not particularly  philosophical,  but  instead,  practical  (iv).  These circumstantial 
reasons also explain why Avicenna grew progressively less accommodating to dualism 
over time (iii). In fact, if Avicenna never really did uphold hylomorphism, but included it 
in his philosophy for reasons external to it, then the most faithful reflection of his views 
are  to  be  found  precisely  in  the  works  that  are  less  accommodating  to  hylomorphic 
terminology. Among the works we have inspected, we can single out both the De anima 
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from The Cure and On the Rational Soul, since in the first Avicenna only used Aristotle’s 
words but not their meanings (cf. page 29), and in the second, he even dropped the words 
altogether  (cf.  page  31).  Since  these  are  also  his  most  original  works,  containing 
arguments that, to this point in the commentary traditions, were never previously upheld 
(such as  the  argument  for  the prophetic  “holy soul”);  and since,  as  we have  argued, 
Avicenna’s position on these matters never really alters substantially, but is only more 
manifested  in these later works; then it follows that Avicenna was an original thinker 
from the start, which means he arrived at many of his most groundbreaking conclusions 
independently  from  the  commentary  traditions.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that 
Avicenna was wholly unaffected by the commentary traditions, as the second extreme 
would hold. Rather, we here contend—and primary source materials seem to point this 
way  as  well,  as  we  will  discuss  below—that  as  regards  the first  principles  of  his 
philosophy (such as the self-subsistent substantiality of the soul), Avicenna established 
them on his own. He was, however, admittedly guided by the commentary traditions, and 
he did, in fact, incorporate on top of these first principles a series of corollary claims 
(such  as  Aristotle’s  divisions  of  the  soul),  which  he  patently  inherited  from  his 
predecessors.
Avicenna’s discussion of his philosophical method reinforces the conclusions of 
the previous paragraph. In the prologue to  The Cure, he observes that there are certain 
“fundamental principles” which can be ascertained either by a “methodical and verified 
theoretical analysis” of what the ancients wrote, or by “insights cooperatively attaining 
the truth.”63 We saw a reflection of this later in  On the Rational Soul  when Avicenna 
63 The Cure, sec. Prologue §1
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distinguished between students who attain  the  truth by reading  truths  and those who 
attain  it  by  discovering  things  through  their  own genius.64 As  we  saw in  that  same 
passage, Avicenna aspired to be in the latter group; it was his  goal, therefore, to be an 
independent thinker. Avicenna himself admits he did attain this independence of thought; 
in The Cure, for instance, he says: “I added some of the things which I perceived through 
my own reflection and whose validity I determined through my own theoretical analysis, 
especially in Physics and Metaphysics—and even in Logic.”65 In a letter to an unnamed 
disciple, Avicenna adds: “[God] has granted me an incessant certainty about fundamental 
principles which  the seeker  of  salvation  must  without  fail  know, and a  wide-ranging 
competence in subsequent areas.”66
This last statement in particular would seem to warrant Seyyed Nasr’s claim that 
Avicenna was not just a philosopher but a mystic. The fact, however, is that Avicenna had 
a  complete  theory—an elaborate  explanatory  framework,  in  fact—for the  process  by 
which philosophers attain the truth, which theory might be branded “mystical” because it 
does have in it an element of the supramundane, but which, insofar as it is an explanatory 
framework,  is far from being mystical in the sense of “cryptic” or “occult.” Avicenna 
develops this framework most fully in the  De anima from  The Cure  and later in  The 
Salvation. In a nutshell, he argues that knowledge is acquired analogously to the way in 
which conclusions are inferred from premises in Syllogistic Logic: just as a conclusion 
can only be inferred in a syllogism if there is a common middle term to the premises, so 
does knowledge proceed from the apprehended essence of things by means of such a 
64 On the Rational Soul, §11
65 The Cure, sec. Prologue §2.
66 Avicenna, “Letter to an Anonymous Disciple,” quoted in Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian 
Tradition, 60
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“middle  term.”  Avicenna  argues,  however,  that  the  acquisition  of  this  “middle  term” 
depends  upon  a  certain  perfected  ability  that  the  human  intellect  by  itself  does  not 
naturally possess. As such, he posits a connection between our limited intellect and a 
supernal or celestial intellect, the Active Intellect, which, because of its closer place to 
God in  the  emanationist  scheme,  does  somehow have  the  ability.  This connection is 
“intuition” (hads). Avicenna,  however,  concludes that there are  varying degrees of it, 
some people (prophets) perceiving truth much like a person senses color; others having 
more difficulty, requiring a bit of research (philosophers); while others still have almost 
no ability at all, needing to be taught everything.67 In this light, we can start to understand 
Avicenna’s distinction in  On the Rational Soul  between people who attain the truths of 
philosophy “through research” and those who attain them “through direct experience:”68 
ultimately, the more intuition one has, the more directly one would experience truth.
We have seen how Avicenna in  On the Rational Soul aspires to be among those 
who have intuition. In that treatise, however, he does not specify the desired degree; nor 
does it suggest anything about his place on the scheme of intuition. We encounter a much 
more telling account, however, in Avicenna’s introduction to The Easterners:
“As for ourselves, getting to understand what they [the Peripatetics] said has been 
easy for us from the very moment when we first occupied ourselves with it since 
it  is  not  unlikely  that  Philosophical  Sciences  may  have  come  to  us  from  a 
direction other than that of the Greeks. We were occupied with it in the prime of  
our youth, and were granted such success by God that we were able thereby to 
come to comprehend in a short time what they bequeathed” (emphasis added).69
By claiming that philosophy came to him through an avenue other than the Greeks, and 
67 The Salvation, chap. VI
68 On the Rational Soul, §11
69 The Easterners, §2
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by attributing to God such success, Avicenna here seems to be placing himself among the 
philosophers who have some intuition but who, unlike the prophets, still require some 
research (in this case, into the doctrines of the Peripatetics) to attain certain knowledge. 
The excerpted passage above seems to  be parallel  to one from the  autobiography,  in 
which Avicenna describes how, in his youth, he used to go to the mosque to pray that the 
“middle terms” be revealed to him:
“Because of those problems that used to baffle me, not being able to solve the 
middle term of the syllogism, I used to visit the mosque frequently and worship, 
praying humbly to the All-Creating until He opened the mystery of it to me and 
made the difficult seem easy.” (emphasis added).70
The implication of both these passages is that Avicenna was, admittedly, not supremely 
gifted like a prophet, that is, to the extent that he would be able to perceive truth simply 
as we perceive colors;  yet  he admits having been given some intuition to understand 
reality without having to spend much time doing very deep research. On the other hand, 
in the letter to an unnamed disciple, Avicenna admits that he came “to know things which 
[he had] verified and [could] not be improved,” though he only did this through “great 
effort,” and the results were “few.”71
The image we are left of Avicenna, therefore, is of a man eminently conscious of 
his place in the intellectual spectrum: he knew he was intelligent, yes; that he had an 
intuitive perception of reality; and that, only because of this, he was able to ascertain the 
hidden truths of the Peripatetics. At the same time, however, he knew that he was not a 
prophet; he admitted that he still had to work hard to attain those truths he ascertained; 
70 The Life of Ibn Sina, 29
71 Avicenna, “Letter to an Anonymous Disciple,” quoted in Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian 
Tradition, 59
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and  that,  as  such,  he  was  indeed  indebted  to  his  predecessors.  This  does  not  mean, 
however, that he saw see himself merely as an iteration in a long chain. Rather, he quite 
clearly  states  in  The Easterners that  his  position  among the  Peripatetics  was more  a 
matter of convenience than philosophical alignment:
“Now, since those who are occupied with Philosophy are forcefully asserting their 
descent from the Peripatetics among the Greeks, we were loath to create schisms 
and disagree  with  the  majority  of  the  people.  We thus  joined their  ranks  and 
adhered in a partisan spirit  to the Peripatetics,  since they were the sect among 
them most worthy of such an adherence. We perfected what they meant to say but 
fell short of doing, never reaching their aim in it; and we pretended not to see 
what they were mistaken about, devising reasons for it  and pretexts, while we 
were conscious of its real nature and aware of its defect. If ever we spoke out 
openly  our  disagreement  with  them,  then  it  concerned  matters  which  it  was 
impossible to tolerate. The greater part [of these matters], however, we concealed 
with the veils of feigned neglect.”72
As we have seen throughout this paper, the issue of hylomorphism in psychology was 
probably one of these areas of disagreement. The fact that he attempted to accommodate 
it  into  his  dualistic  account  of  the  soul  in  the  beginning  of  his  career  perhaps 
distinguishes it from those areas of disagreement about which he “feigned neglect;” that 
he was ultimately unsuccessful, however, and that he eventually dropped it altogether, 
means  that,  notwithstanding  his  attempts  to  “devis[e]  reasons  for  it  and  pretexts,” 
ultimately his allegiance was to what he perceived as truth, not partisanship.
72 Avicenna, The Easterners, §3
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